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I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) marks a
fundamental change in the attitudes of Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) toward local telephone exchange
2
carrier policy. While signing the 1996 Act into law, President Clinton said,
“[T]oday, with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with our future.
We will help to create an open marketplace where competition and
3
innovation can move as quick as light.” The 1996 Act codifies a reversal
in philosophy from an assumption that local exchange carriers (“LECs”)
are natural monopolists, to a belief that market forces are the best
mechanism for prompting innovation and service expansion while
4
maintaining fair rate structures for consumers and resellers. This change
has impacted LECs in many ways, including their relationships with the
owners of multiple tenant environments (“MTEs”), such as office buildings
5
and apartment complexes.
Under the 1996 Act, FCC rulemaking increased access of competitive
local exchange carriers (“CLECs”) to the facilities of incumbent local
6
exchange carriers (“ILECs”) by removing competition barriers. Owners of

1. 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2000).
2. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: SPECIAL
REPORT 8 (1996).
3. Remarks by the President in Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications Act
Conference Report (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/OP/telecom/
release.html.
4. See HUBER, supra note 2, at 3-4, 7-8.
5. See generally Steven D. Cohen & Jeffrey A. Moerdler, The Effect of
Telecommunications Laws and Regulations on Real Property Interests, in TELECOM REAL
ESTATE STRATEGIES: HOW TO LEASE & DEVELOP THE “SMART BUILDING” IN THE DOT-COM
AGE 45-52 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2001).
6. Id.
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7

MTEs, however, can also act as barriers to LEC competition. Here, the
possible regulatory responses are less clear and more problematic. One
answer is to directly regulate MTE owners by requiring that they not enter
into exclusive contracts with LECs. There is concern, however, that this
response fails to adequately open the market to competition. The FCC
proposed directly imposing a nondiscrimination requirement on MTE
8
owners. In fact, the FCC has little or no authority over nontelecommunications providers. Indeed, for many years the FCC left
9
customer premises issues to the marketplace, or state regulatory authority.
As an alternative measure, the FCC proposed a more indirect regulatory
approach that would forbid LECs from “dealing with MTE owners who
10
maintain a discriminatory policy against competing carriers.” However,
these additional proposals raise both statutory and constitutional concerns.
This Note will first review the general purpose behind the 1996 Act.
It will then outline the history of LEC access to MTEs under the 1996 Act.
Finally, this Note will examine three questions related to proposed FCC
rules for nondiscriminatory LEC access to MTEs: The first question is
whether the FCC may prevent MTE owners from adhering to
discriminatory policies towards LECs through direct regulation without
resulting in a taking. The second question is whether the FCC may
alternatively prevent MTE owners from adhering to discriminatory policies
towards LECs indirectly through regulations preventing LECs from
contracting with landlords who are unwilling to act in accordance with the
pro-competition spirit of the 1996 Act, or whether this would also result in
a regulatory taking. The final question is whether regulation of access to
MTEs is required to enhance competition, and if it is counterproductive to
the goals underlying the proposed rules.

7. See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomms. Mkts., First Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Dkt. No. 99-217, Fifth Report
and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Dkt. No. 96-98, and Fourth Report
and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Dkt. No. 88-57, 15 F.C.C.R. 22983,
paras. 124-26, 22 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (2000) [hereinafter Promotion of Competitive
Networks Report and Order].
8. See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomms. Mkts., Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry in WT Dkt. No. 99-217, and Third Further
Notice of Proposed RM in CC Dkt. No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 12673, paras. 58-60, 22 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 2005 (1999) [hereinafter Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking].
9. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501 at 11648, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1312 (1998) (noting that Congress originally
included jurisdictional limitations on the FCC’s authority; exceptions to these limitations are
made explicit).
10. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 144.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
AND LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER ACCESS RULES
A.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

As a result of the 1996 Act, at the time hailed as the harbinger of a
new era of local exchange competition, the FCC began a process of
extensive rulemaking in order to implement the wide-ranging provisions of
11
the 1996 Act. This reflects a belief that the change from a highly
regulated system to a market-driven system cannot occur without an
12
intermediary period guided by new rules. Whether this belief is accurate
or not, it is apparent that the 1996 Act will “fundamentally change[]
telecommunications regulation” by supplanting earlier policies that
13
sheltered monopolies with the support of efficient competition.
The dual (and to a degree conflicting) purposes behind the 1996 Act,
as it relates to telephony, were to increase the scope, access, and coverage
14
of a nationwide telephone service and to promote competition in all
15
aspects of telephone services. The first goal, nationwide service, was a
codification and expansion of the aim of the Communications Act of 1934
16
(1934 Act) of “providing telephone service to everyone.” The second
goal, fostering competition, continued a trend that began in 1954, in the
modern era, when Hush-a-Phone Corporation won an action challenging an
AT&T tariff prohibiting the attachment of any mechanism not furnished by
17
AT&T to any part of its operating system and persisted with the opening

11. See HUBER, supra note 2, at 51.
12. See id.
13. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 1, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 1 (1996) [hereinafter Implementation of Local Competition Provisions First Report and
Order].
14. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. V 2000).
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. . . .
Id.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. V 2000). “No State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” Id.
16. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 351 (2d ed.
1998).
17. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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18

of long-distance service to competition. The 1996 Act finally discarded
the long-held belief that LECs were natural monopolies and opened all wire
19
lines to competition. It is this second goal of promoting competition,
particularly among LECs, that relates most directly to the subject of
this Note.
Competition is now presumed to be “the best means of promoting
rapid deployment of advanced information technologies by the private
20
sector, rather than the government.” The 1996 Act enables this increased
competition in the communications industry by authorizing the FCC to
21
engage in pro-competitive and, hopefully, deregulatory rulemaking.
During this interim, between the pre-1996 Act era and a fully functional
competitive market, the industry is moving through informal re-regulation
and managed competition in several different ways.
First, the 1996 Act prohibits indirect and direct unjust preferences or
22
discriminatory practices with regard to communication services. The FCC
issued a Special Access Collocation Order mandating LEC-owned essential
23
facilities to allow non-discriminatory access at fair rates. Second, in an
24
expansion of the 1934 Act and the Pole Attachments Act, CLECs were
given access to rights-of-way and easements owned or controlled by ILECs
25
and other utilities. This provision was found to be a regulatory taking, but
was deemed facially constitutional due to adequate provisions for ensuring
26
just compensation. Third, although the 1996 Act “does not preempt the
authority of state and local governments ‘over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities’ within their jurisdictions, it nevertheless imposes substantive and
procedural limitations on the power of local authorities to make zoning
18. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 259(a) (Supp. V 2000).
20. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (N.D. Ala.
1997).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 259(a).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994).
23. Alexander C. Larson et al., Competitive Access Issues and Telecommunications
Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 419, 434 (1994). See also GTE South Inc. v.
Morrison, 957 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“The Act mandates that existing local
exchange carriers . . . like Plaintiff . . . allow interconnecting services providers access to
local networks in order to provide competing local telephone service.”) (citing Telecomms.
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (1996)).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4) (Supp. V 2000).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1) (Supp. V 2000). “A utility shall provide . . . any
telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or
right-of-way owned or controlled by it.” Id.
26. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
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27

decisions affecting such matters.” States may not enact legislation that
28
would impede the purpose of the 1996 Act.

B. Ongoing Discriminatory Local Exchange Carrier Access to
Multiple Tenant Environments Under the 1996 Act
As noted infra, the purpose behind section 251 of the 1996 Act is
29
facilitation of LEC competition. To further this purpose, the section
contains a listing of ILEC requirements such as interconnection access for
30
CLECs. As CLECs develop competitive facilities-based networks, they
31
too will become subject to the cooperative components of section 251.
Initial implementation disputes occurred and led Congress to enact section
32
252 to provide for mediation or arbitration. In the long run, section
251(b)(4) of the 1996 Act was largely unnoticed by LECs because they had
already worked out methods for sharing equipment. However, the statute
was read by the FCC to include MTEs and again became a source of
33
controversy.
Telephone companies, like other utilities, normally gain access to
property through right-of-way agreements, easements, and less commonly
34
the power of eminent domain. LEC access to MTEs, in particular,
developed in a very different environment, due to the long-held monopoly
27. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (N.D. Ala.
1997).
28. See supra note 15; RT Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000)
(giving “Chevron deference” to FCC decisions regarding whether or not a state regulation is
a barrier to the 1996 Act or is competitively neutral; FCC ruling preempted the state law).
29. See Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The Challenge of
Competition, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1996).
30. Id.
The six [ILEC] obligations [under § 251(c)] are: (1) the ILEC must negotiate with
[CLECs] the terms of section 251 in good faith; (2) the ILEC must provide, at just
and reasonable rates, interconnection with competitors so that calls may be
transmitted and routed between their networks; (3) the ILEC must provide access
to network elements on an unbundled basis so that competitors are allowed to
combine such elements to provide complete telecommunications services; (4) the
ILEC must offer services it provides at retail to competitors at wholesale prices so
that the competitors may offer such services for resale; (5) the ILEC must give
reasonable notice of any changes made in its networks or facilities that would
affect interoperability with competitors; and (6) the ILEC must allow competitors
to physically locate on their premises, unless physical location is not practical due
to technical limitations or because of space limitations.
Id. at 1259-60.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 1265 (stating that all 50 states have received requests for arbitration or
mediation).
33. Cohen & Moerdler, supra note 5, at 35.
34. Id. at 45.
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status of ILECs, such as Bell operating companies and GTE. Several early
efforts by the FCC to introduce competition into local markets prior to
1996 failed when courts held that “the Commission’s authority at that time
36
did not encompass the power to order such physical collocation.”
Therefore, MTE owners were unable to choose between competitors when
37
installing phone service. Furthermore, if they wished to attract renters,
MTE owners had no choice but to allow the LEC to wire their buildings.
MTE owners, accordingly, have generally given phone companies free
access, despite the absence of a mandate to do so. Assumed access also led
phone companies to bypass the formality of negotiating easements in
38
MTEs. Consequently, most agreements between LECs and MTE owners
39
amounted to little more than written or even verbal licenses. The absence
of existing easements giving perpetual access and control to ILECs would
40
become important when local exchanges were opened to competition.
When competition among LECs was authorized by the 1996 Act,
access to MTEs became a valuable commodity and sparked a struggle
41
between ILECs, CLECs, and MTE owners for favorable legislation. LECs
began vying for “special statutory or regulatory rights of access” to
42
MTEs. MTE owners began to see the profit potential and started charging
LECs access fees. They are interested in maintaining the right to negotiate
43
for the highest possible fees. Because ILECs never acquired easements,
wires in MTEs are often the building owner’s property. Thus, the 1996
amendment to the Pole Attachment Act, held constitutional in Gulf Power
44
v. United States, is inapplicable in this setting.

35. Id. After the divestiture of AT&T, Bell operating companies and GTE, as LECs,
were allowed to maintain monopolies due to the widely held belief that local loops were
natural monopolies. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
36. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 8.
37. See generally KRATTENMAKER, supra note 16, at 348.
38. Cohen & Moerdler, supra note 5, at 45.
39. Id. “Unlike easements, a license is a revocable, non-assignable privilege to use the
land of another.” Id. at 46.
40. Id. at 46-47.
41. See id. at 46.
42. Id.
43. Id. Jeffrey A. Moerdler, Found Money: New Opportunities in Telecommunications
Leases, in TELECOM REAL ESTATE STRATEGIES: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW IN TODAY’S
ECONOMY 361, 361-62 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2002) (talking to renters about the new
opportunities created by new telecommunications environment for charging fees for access
to buildings).
44. 187 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
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C. Proposed FCC Rulemaking Regarding Nondiscriminatory
Access to Multiple Tenant Environments
In the 1996 Act, Congress required LECs to make their facilities
available, at reasonable rates, for interconnection with other LECs sharing
the same market to promote the entry of competitive LECs into all local
45
markets. Facilities-based competition is essential to a truly competitive
46
market. In fact, ILECs must show either that facilities-based competition
exists or that no requests to interconnect were made before they can offer
in-region interLATA services—those that cross designated local service
47
area boundaries. This approach is intended to be helpful to consumers
because it will end dependence on ILECs. Dependence on ILECs is
problematic in two respects: ILEC lines may not support new, innovative
technology—CLECs may be better at bringing new technology to
48
consumers; and in the absence of competition, ILECs may lack the
49
necessary incentive optimally to create and employ new technology.
The FCC responded to Congress’s mandate, in part, with its First
50
Report and Order regarding competitive access in local markets. This
order began implementing the interconnection, unbundling, and resale
51
provisions of the 1996 Act. It also asked for commentary on
nondiscriminatory access to MTEs. A Second Report and Order closely
52
followed the First Order. In this order, the FCC promulgated rules
regarding toll and local dialing parity, and universal service support
53
services. However, the FCC failed to enforce these provisions when it
54
appeared that enforcement would inhibit CLECs from competing.
45. Implementation of Local Competition Provisions First Report and Order, supra
note 13, para. 3.
46. See D.R. Stewart, Competition Stiffens Among Local Carriers, TULSA WORLD, June
28, 2001, at 3 (stating that facilities-based CLECs are more likely to succeed).
47. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions First Report and Order, supra
note 13, para. 4.
48. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 23.
49. Id.
50. Implementation of Local Competition Provisions First Report and Order, supra
note 13.
51. Id. para. 4.
52. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 19392
(1996).
53. I.e., nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services, directory
assistance and directory listings, disclosure of network info, and numbering administration.
Id.
54. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 8.
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A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, and Third
55
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking closely followed. The FCC
described its purpose in this order as initiating “a rulemaking proceeding to
consider certain actions to facilitate the development of competitive
telecommunications networks, and [to] commence[] an inquiry into certain
56
other issues related to this goal.” This order contained several findings
relevant to this discussion.
The FCC found that the 1996 Act contains provisions for CLEC
57
and requires ILECs to provide
access to pole attachments
nondiscriminatory access to facilities and equipment, services at wholesale
to resellers, and unbundled network elements—all at fair and reasonable
58
rates. Together, these provisions provide evidence of Congress’s concern
that consumers have a choice, and that ILECs and other utility access
providers (e.g., electric utility pole owners) do not act as a barrier to
59
competition and choice. However, although nondiscriminatory access to
facilities is now a reality, the certainty of CLEC access to pole attachments,
while clearly Congress’s hope, is less assured. Furthermore, these
provisions do not guarantee that choice will be there even if their
implementation is successful. The availability of choice and access to a
variety of competitive service providers for all consumers, regardless of
60
whether they are commercial or private, renters or owners, is mandated.
The FCC, therefore, looked at other means of achieving its desired end.
Consequently, in this order the FCC considered actions that would “ensure
that competitive providers will have reasonable and nondiscriminatory
access to rights-of-way, buildings, rooftops, and facilities in multiple tenant
61
environments.”
Competitive providers include CLECs with end-to-end facilities,
CLECs that use ILECs’ unbundled elements to provide service, and
62
resellers. CLECs are less than five percent of the market share but are
63
making rapid gains. They are “deploying fiber in their networks at a faster
rate than incumbent LECs and are rapidly acquiring numbering resources
necessary to provide switched telephone services over their own
55. See generally id.
56. Id. para. 1.
57. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. V 2000).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)-(4) (Supp. V 2000).
59. See Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra
note 8, para. 33.
60. Id.
61. Id. para. 1.
62. See id. para. 4.
63. Id. para. 11.
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64

facilities.” CLECs may challenge ILECs by using new broadband
technology to compete with the old narrowband technology used by ILECs,
65
an endeavor that could require new facilities.
The FCC characterized these findings as positive but noted that more
efforts are needed as only select market segments are currently benefiting
66
from competition. Furthermore, only a small portion of CLECs are
67
facilities-based competitors. This is important because the FCC has
reason to believe that the only long-term and effective way to dismantle the
ILECs’ “bottleneck control” over physical facilities is to develop strategies
68
that will encourage and support facilities-based competition. The FCC
does not address whether owners of networks other than LECs should be
69
required to make their facilities accessible to third parties. However, the
Commission recognizes that, in promoting competition, it may need to take
70
action to remove competitive barriers created by third parties. In MTEs
this issue is central because the owner, rather than the ILEC, frequently
controls access. Therefore, after discussion, the FCC requested
commentary on nondiscriminatory access to buildings where the existing
71
wires are owned and controlled by building owners rather than by ILECs.
72
Access to MTEs is critical. As of 1990, approximately twenty-eight
73
percent of all housing units were in MTEs. Furthermore, many
commercial enterprises are located in MTEs, and business customers are
74
among the most lucrative clients of LECs. Access is not a problem for
64. Id.
65. Id. See also KRATTENMAKER, supra note 16, at 344 (“Because voice (and simple
data) transmission does not require much bandwidth, telephone wires until very recently
have been relatively ‘thin’ in the sense that they are incapable of carrying messages (such as
television pictures) that require more bandwidth.”).
66. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 13.
67. Id. para. 21.
68. Id. para. 4.
69. Id. para. 19.
70. See id. para. 28.
71. See Telecomms. Servs. Inside Wiring; Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer
Prot. and Competition Act of 1992, Report And Order and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 3659, para. 179, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 193 (1997)
[hereinafter Telecomm. Servs. Inside Wiring Report and Order].
72. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 29.
73. Id.
74. Not only do businesses typically require more extensive and technologically
advanced telephone systems than the average individual consumer, but they have
historically paid higher rates for service than residential consumers as an “implicit subsidy”
of universal service. Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982
paras. 30, 38, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997).
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resellers and purchasers of unbundled elements, but facilities-based
CLECs, the group most essential to long-term competition, must either
obtain permission to install their own wires or to gain access to existing
75
wires from the ILEC, the MTE owner, or both. Although two states have
76
enacted mandatory access rules, and other states have more limited
77
provisions, this patchwork approach may not be adequate for achieving
the 1996 Act’s goals of competition and access. In fact, the FCC found that
denial of access at a reasonable and fair rate to CLECs is a valid problem
78
potentially requiring a regulatory remedy. To this end, the FCC included
discussions on section 224 and access to unbundled elements per section
79
251 and its ability to force ILECs to grant CLECs the required access.
These provisions, however, are not controlling when the facilities in
80
question are controlled by the MTE owner. A discussion of
nondiscriminatory access to facilities controlled by the premises owner
81
therefore ensued. First, the Commission agreed that nondiscriminatory
82
access to buildings would enhance competition. Then, the FCC asked for
comment on whether MTE owners should be directly regulated and
required by law to allow nondiscriminatory access or, alternatively,
regulated indirectly by prohibiting LECs from servicing MTEs with
discriminatory access practices. In other words, the FCC sought input on
whether owners who allow one LEC access must allow others access on
83
similar terms. The last Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was

75. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 30.
76. Texas only allows property owners to impose reasonable limits on the number of
telecommunication services with access to the property. TEX. UTILITIES CODE ANN. §
54.260 (Vernon 1998). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-247i (2001).
77. Minnesota law requires that MTE owners who use a CLEC provider must, upon a
tenant’s request, allow the ILEC to provide services to tenants. MINN. STAT. § 237.68.3
(2001).
78. See Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra
note 8, paras. 31-34.
79. Id. See also Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
80. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 52.
81. See id. para. 51.
82. Telecomm. Servs. Inside Wiring Report and Order, supra note 71, para. 178.
83. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8
(seeking comment on: (1) “the effectiveness of existing State statutes and regulations
governing building access,” id. para. 54; (2) is a “national nondiscriminatory access
requirement” needed, id. para. 55; (3) “whether the imposition of a nondiscrimination
requirement on building owners would be within [the FCC’s] statutory authority,” id. para.
56; (4) whether a “constitutional impediment” exists, id. para. 58; and (5) any practical
problems related to enforcement of nondiscriminatory access, id. para. 63).
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84

adopted on October 12, 2000. In it, the FCC took further action to
85
enhance services to consumers in MTEs and, once again, asked for
86
comment on, among other things, nondiscriminatory access.
Since the Fifth Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, the FCC issued a Public Notice on June 25, 2001. The Public Notice
postponed the request for comment on telecommunications services in
MTEs. The delay was because the FCC wanted analysis based on up-todate, state-of-the-market information gathered after the implementation of
the best practices model advocated by the Real Access Alliance, a real
87
estate industry group active in this rulemaking process. However, the Real
Access Alliance best practices model, which was made public on May 22,
2001, has not yet been fully implemented in a manner allowing educated
88
commentary on its impact. Then on November 30, 2001, the FCC issued
another Public Notice again requesting commentary on a variety of MTE89
related issues surrounding LEC access.

III. A SUMMARY OF CASE LAW DEALING WITH THREE TYPES
OF TAKINGS PROHIBITED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Property is a fundamental and important part of our society and our
market economy. It defines people’s relationships with things and
encompasses a “bundle of rights,” including the right to use and dispose of
90
private property. Arguably, the most essential aspect of a right in property
91
is the “right to exclude” others from using one’s property. However, the

84. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7.
85. Id. para. 1. The FCC’s order mandated the following: it forbade telecom carriers in
commercial MTEs from contracts with building owners, including exclusivity contracts; it
established procedures to reduce CLECs’ dependence on ILECs regarding gaining access to
on-premises wiring in part by allowing owners the right to request a change in the
demarcation point; and it determined that Section 224 does assure CLECs fair and
reasonable access to conduits and rights-of-way in buildings that are controlled by a utility.
86. Those other things included status of market, whether exclusive contract prohibition
should be extended to residential buildings, preferential marketing agreements (should they
be allowed?), definition of right-of-way in MTEs, and extension of cable inside wiring rules.
Id.
87. See Wireless Telecomms. Bureau Postpones Request for Comment on Current State
of the Market for Local and Advanced Telecomms. Servs. in Multitenant Env’ts, Public
Notice, 16 F.C.C.R. 12830 (2001).
88. Id.
89. See Wireless Telecomms. Bureau Requests Comment on Current State of the
Market for Local and Advanced Telecomms. Servs. in Multitenant Env’ts, Public Notice, 16
F.C.C.R. 20971 (2001).
90. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277,
286 (2001).
91. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
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92

Fifth Amendment’s takings clause does not prohibit the government from
93
taking property—physically, through regulation, or derivatively. Instead,
it allows for government takings as long as the original owner is
94
compensated for his or her loss. In physical takings, even minute
95
infringements will trigger the need for compensation. For a regulatory
taking to occur, the regulation must eliminate the economic value of
96
the property.
The purpose behind the compensation clause is disputed. One reason
suggested is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
97
public as a whole.” Another reason is that compensation may prevent the
98
overuse of the government’s power of eminent domain. Finally, the
libertarian approach argues “a natural right to property . . . that exists
99
independent of custom or positive law,” suggesting that any interference
100
with property without compensation violates the property owner’s rights.
The law surrounding physical takings is clearly summarized in
101
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. The Court drew on
decisions from the turn of the century and held that regardless of
diminution of value (or lack thereof) and the existence of a competing
public good served by the action in question, if a permanent physical
occupation of private property results from the government’s regulations, it
is a per se taking and compensation is therefore required under the
102
Fifth Amendment.
This approach would almost amount to black letter law, except for the
holding of the Court in Yee v. City of Escondido that a rent control

92. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 280.
94. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (2nd ed. 1977).
95. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(finding a taking occurred even though the total loss of property value was one dollar).
96. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (noting that if the taking is
ascribable to nuisance prevention, then no compensation is required).
97. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
98. POSNER, supra note 94, at 41 (noting that compensation is intended to function as a
guarantee that condemned land is in fact more valuable to the condemnor than the owner).
99. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 396 (2000).
100. Id.
101. 458 U.S. at 426-38. See also Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 132829 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a taking had occurred under the per se physical takings
rule established in Loretto).
102. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982); U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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103

ordinance did not constitute a taking. The pertinent regulation required
mobile home park operators to accept replacement tenants whom they
104
found undesirable. In Yee, however, the Court relied on the fact that by
ceasing to let out space for trailers altogether, the landlords could still
105
legally evict the unwanted tenants. In this way, the Court characterized
106
the forced rental as a use requirement. As a land use requirement, the
107
regulation was not an unconstitutional taking.
A second kind of taking, a regulatory taking, can occur if a regulation
so completely destroys a property’s value as to render the property
108
worthless. “[I]t is not consistent with the historical compact embodied in
the Takings Clause that title to real estate is held subject to the State’s
109
subsequent decision to eliminate all economically beneficial use . . . .”
However, in contrast with cases in which a physical occupation of property
occurs, land-use regulations that “substantially advance legitimate state
110
interests” without depriving “an owner [of] economically viable use of
111
his land” are not takings. A test for whether a regulatory taking has
occurred can be found in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, a case involving a historic preservation regulation that prevented the
owners of Grand Central Terminal from building an office building over
112
the station. The Court concluded that there was not a taking after
applying factors that amounted to a three-part test: “owner’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations,” “the nature of the government action,”
113
and “the degree of diminution in property value.”

103. 503 U.S. 519, 539 (1992).
104. Id. at 524.
105. Id. at 519-20.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 539.
108. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J., recognizing that a
taking may occur without physical occupation of land).
109. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992).
110. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
111. Id.; see also Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.”). The all-or-nothing theory behind regulatory takings leads
to the ironic result that a property holder whose property value is decreased 100% gets full
value, a property holder whose property value is decreased 95% by a regulation gets no
compensation, and property holders who suffer a physical invasion, no matter how trivial,
are fully compensated. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
112. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
113. Id. (concluding that the transportation company was not barred from continuing to
use the train station for the purpose for which it was built; that the regulation did, in fact,
serve a valuable public good; and that the train station should provide a reasonable return on
the owners’ investment).
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, a case involving a rule that
conditioned new building permits on landowners acquiescing to public
easements on their property, expanded on the Penn Central assertion that
“a use restriction may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to
114
the effectuation of a substantial government purpose.” In Nollan, the
Court required that a nexus exist between the regulation’s purpose and the
115
regulation’s effect. The Court found that a regulatory goal of reducing
barriers, both physical and psychological, to the public’s ability to see and
appreciate the beach was not rationally furthered by a rule that allowed
people to build and thus obstruct the public’s view of the water, so long as
116
an access easement was granted.
The Court in Nollan asked whether an “essential nexus” connected
117
the regulation and the government’s interest. It failed to find a nexus and
therefore chose not to address the relative strength or weakness of the
118
connection. In Dolan, the Court elucidated upon this additional factor for
119
identifying valid regulatory takings. Dolan involved a decision by city
officials to require a building permit applicant to set aside land to be used
120
as a greenway for flood management and for a bicycle path. The Court
found that because building up the commercial district did in fact add to
flood runoff, a nexus did exist. However, because a mere use restriction
would have created the greenway and findings did not support the assertion
that one store would add enough traffic congestion to warrant making the
applicant alone bear the cost of public works, the city had not met its
121
burden. In essence, the remedy was out of proportion to the applicant’s
role in creating the problem. This led to the second expansion on the rules
122
from Penn Central: “rough proportionality.” Under Nollan and Dolan,
therefore, a property owner can be forced to suffer an uncompensated
taking if the taking is regulatory, rationally related to the government
123
interest, and roughly proportional.

114. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 127).
115. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
116. Id. at 836.
117. Id. at 837.
118. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838).
119. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
120. Id. at 379.
121. Id. at 394-95.
122. Id. at 391 (holding that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
123. See id.; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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A. Whether Either, or Both, Nondiscriminatory Access
Requirement Proposals Constitute Takings Under the Fifth
Amendment
Under the proposed nondiscriminatory access requirement, MTE
owners in control of wire routes to which facilities-based CLECs must gain
access in order to provide services to tenants will be either (a) required to
allow CLECs access under “nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and
124
or (b) pressured into nondiscriminatory access by a
conditions,”
regulation prohibiting LECs from dealing with MTE owners who engage in
125
discriminatory practices. A concern is that either, or both, of these
126
proposed rules would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
The analysis will first examine the direct regulation of MTE owners in
relation to takings and will then analyze the indirect regulation of the
matter via LECs. The ramifications of these analyses will be discussed in
the following Section.

B. Whether the FCC May Prevent MTE Owners from Adhering to
Discriminatory Policies Toward LECs Through Direct Regulation
One proposed version of the rule would require MTE owners to allow
CLECs access to their buildings “under nondiscriminatory rates, terms and
127
conditions.” Under this approach, MTE owners would be forced to allow
CLECs to use unbundled services on lines already in existence or to lay
128
new line in the building. This rule essentially eliminates a property
owner’s ability to exclude—a right, as mentioned infra, normally believed
129
to be at the heart of property rights.
In the case of facilities-based CLECs, the FCC would authorize LECs
130
to physically occupy a portion of an MTE owner’s property. Even within
the context of access through purchase of unbundled services, an attenuated
argument could be made that the signals passing through the wire constitute

124. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 53.
125. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 127.
126. Id. para. 125.
127. Id.
128. Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomms. Market, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry in WT Docket No. 99-217, and Third Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 12673, paras. 4-5, 52
(1999).
129. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
130. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 125.
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131

physical occupation. The question is: What type of taking, if any, occurs
under this rule? If the rule directly authorizes physical occupation of
private property it would constitute a physical, or per se, taking. If the rule
is not a per se taking, it should be subjected to a different analysis, such as
132
a regulatory taking.
In Loretto, the Court laid out the law for situations involving the
133
required physical occupation of property. Loretto involved a claim by the
Petitioner that the existence of cable lines in an MTE building she
purchased constituted a taking in light of a New York statute requiring
134
MTE owners to allow cable companies access to their buildings. The
Court held that if the access is required, and it results in a permanent
physical occupation, the access is, in fact, a physical taking and
135
compensation must be provided. The Court established this as a per se
rule so long as the rule is not outweighed by benefit to the public or other
136
valid government interest.
The lower courts follow the Loretto rule without any meaningful
137
modification or interference. The Gulf Power court restated the Loretto
rule: “[A]lthough property is subject to broad regulatory power, a
regulation becomes a taking when the government authorizes permanent,
138
physical occupation by a third party.” In Gulf Power, a utility brought
suit against the federal government regarding section 224(f)(1) of the 1996
139
Act, known as the Pole Attachment Act. The Court of Appeals held that
Loretto required the court to find a taking of the power utility’s property
140
because of the “Act’s mandatory access provision.” The Pole Attachment
Act requires utilities to “provide . . . any telecommunications carrier with
nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned
141
or controlled by it.” In Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that because it could identify situations
where the FCC order for ILEC/CLEC collocation before the 1996 Act

131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450 n.8 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 144.
133. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419.
134. Id. at 421-22.
135. Id. at 441.
136. Id. at 434-35.
137. E.g., Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439-40).
138. Id.
139. Gulf Power, 187 F.3d 1324.
140. Id. at 1328.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1) (Supp. V 2000).
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would create a taking, in the absence of explicit statutory authority, the
142
regulation must be overturned. These cases mean that the proposed
regulation requiring MTE owners to allow CLECs access would constitute
a taking requiring compensation, regardless of whether line was laid or
signals were merely passed through the lines. However, it is not clear
whether the proposed rule requires actual access or merely asserts that if an
MTE owner chooses to allow any access at all, it must be
equal access.
Under this interpretation, the Loretto element of “required” is absent
and the precedent set in FCC v. Florida Power Corp. may be more
143
pertinent. Florida Power involved an FCC order regulating the rates
utilities could charge cable television providers for access to the utilities’
144
power lines. The lower court, relying on Loretto, held this to be a taking.
The Supreme Court, however, pointed out that the holding in Loretto was
narrow, and inapplicable to a situation where access was not required by a
regulation. The directive only regulated the fees that could be imposed by
145
utilities and was not possessory.
The Supreme Court in Yee again upheld the notion that the “required”
146
element is “at the heart of . . . occupation.” The Court stated that the
ordinance did not require mobile home park owners to allow occupation of
their property, but rather regulated the rental process should an owner
147
choose to rent his or her land. Rather, the ordinance regulated land use
because it did not compel the owners to allow occupation, and furthermore,
it allowed for eviction should the owner wish to change the use of
148
the land.
The Petitioners argued that their inability to set rental rates or select
their tenants resulted in renters occupying their land at a rate below the
market rate. Furthermore, renters can sell their right at a premium that
would not have existed without the regulation, causing the transfer of “a
discrete interest in land . . . from the park owner to the mobile home
149
owner.”
This argument failed because no physical taking was
150
demonstrated. The Court explicitly chose not to address the question of
whether a regulatory taking occurred because the parties had not briefed
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

24 F.3d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
480 U.S. 245 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 252-53.
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 527.
Id.
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that issue, but a regulatory takings analysis would have been the correct
151
framework for the inquiry.
A colorable argument exists that the
“required” element is absent from the proposed rule as in Florida Power
152
and Yee, and that Loretto is, in fact, inapplicable.
Nowhere in the proposed rule does the FCC require MTE owners to
153
allow LECs access to their buildings. The rule is only concerned that if
access is granted, it be nondiscriminatory. The proposed rule is a response
to complaints by CLECs that building owners have “obstructed competing
telecommunications carriers from obtaining access on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms to necessary facilities located within multiple unit
154
premises.” The lack of any explicit requirement for granting access takes
the proposed rule outside Loretto’s rubric. As a property use requirement,
which regulates “the relationship between landlord and [CLEC],” no
155
undesired physical invasion occurs and thus no physical taking. The
imposed inability to freely select a carrier is analogous to the mobile home
156
park owners’ inability to always select a tenant of their own choosing.
The fact that value was transferred from the MTE owner to the CLEC, in
that the right to charge high fees becomes the right to access at lower fees,
157
does not equal physical occupation. The government can clearly regulate
158
the rates of a public service—even if conducted on private property —
159
”[s]o long as the rates set are not confiscatory.”
The argument falters, however, because of the nature of the service in
question. Unlike utilities in Florida Power that could take or leave cable
services renting access to their lines, MTE owners most likely see
telephone service as essential. By not allowing access to any phone
151. Id. at 535.
152. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Yee,
503 U.S. at 539.
153. See generally Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7
(requiring nondiscriminatory access if an owner decides to wire his or her building, but not
requiring owners of MTEs to wire their buildings in the first place).
154. Promotion of Competitive Networks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 8,
para. 31.
For example, WinStar’s Vice President for Real Estate has stated in an affidavit
that “many building owners and/or building management are requesting nonrecurring fees, recurring fees, per linear foot basis charges, and a variety of other”
charges that are not based on their costs and are not imposed on incumbent
carriers.
Id.
155. Yee, 503 U.S. at 528.
156. Id. at 527.
157. Id. at 526-27.
158. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1877).
159. FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 253 (1987).
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company, MTE owners would so decrease their property values as rental
property as to effectively lose the right to act as a lessor of property. “[A]
landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his
160
forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation.”
Yee holds, however, that Loretto’s bar on conditioning continued use
on accepting an unconstitutional taking is not relevant to a regulatory
161
takings analysis. As in Yee, the landlord can avoid the access requirement
and additional phone lines within the building by changing the building’s
use—the commercial tenants reside in the building by invitation, not by
162
The rule covers only MTEs that house
government intervention.
commercial tenants; noncommercial buildings or single-tenant buildings
163
would not be covered.
However, due to market realities such as long-term leases and the low
probability of a single tenant, MTE owners would be forced to comply long
before finding a viable alternative use for their property. Therefore, it is
likely that although a regulatory takings analysis is facially appropriate, the
court would find that it essentially amounted to a physical taking that
required compensation. This is especially true due to the Court’s strong
aversion to allowing a physical taking, no matter how insignificant. This
rule tracks the facts in Loretto too closely. The holding in that case is too
uncompromising to make it likely that a court would allow the FCC to take
property owners’ rights to physically exclude third parties without
compensation. The court is likely to hold, as in United States v. Causby,
that “an owner is entitled to the absolute and undisturbed possession of
every part of his premises, including the space above, as much as a mine
164
beneath.” In fact, the argument that a direct imposition of an access

160. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 (1982).
Cf. Cable Holdings of Ga. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir.
1992) (“Congress does not have the constitutional power to authorize such a permanent
physical occupation of an owner’s private property. That principle would seem to apply
even when a property owner has privately allowed other occupations which are ‘compatible’
with a government-sanctioned invasion.”). Additionally, if the landlord receives
compensation implicitly by adjusting the rent, the so-called takings may actually be
compensated—assuming the additional services add value. See Thomas W. Merrill, 80 NW.
U. L. REV. 1561 (1986); Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent
Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1083 (1987).
161. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527.
162. Id. at 528.
163. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, paras. 15, 27.
164. 328 U.S. 256, 265 n.10 (1946) (citing Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 79 N.E. 716, 718
(N.Y. 1906)).
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requirement constitutes a per se taking is exactly the analysis accepted last
165
year in one state court.
If, however, the court chooses instead to analyze the rule under
regulatory takings law, the outcome could be quite different. As noted,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City defines the test for
166
regulatory takings. In this case, applying this test likely leads to the
conclusion that the proposed rule does not constitute a taking.
In choosing to comply with the proposed rule, MTE owners can still
recoup the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” they held upon
determination to purchase a large office building—the addition of phone
wires takes nothing from owners in terms of their ability to rent space. In
fact, as long as the CLEC bore the costs of wiring and indemnified the
process, the only real cost to the MTE owner would occur during
construction due to potential inconvenience offset by the potential overall
increase in value resulting from improved technological services. This is
not a case where a regulation goes too far and “frustrate[s] distinct
167
investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking.’”
Furthermore, the government action will promote the important goal
of increasing LEC competition, a goal Congress defined as serving the
public interest. Unlike the clear case posed in physical takings, it is harder
to demonstrate a taking “when interference [with property] arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
168
promote the common good.” It is assumed that good governance will
require infringement upon property values at times, and that to require an
169
absolute reckoning in all cases would be unreasonable. In fact, the
Supreme Court held that it is constitutional for a state actually to destroy
“one class of property [without compensation] in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the
170
public.” It is rational for the FCC to promulgate a rule for the public’s
benefit that incidentally subjects MTE owners to temporary inconvenience
and minimal, if any, diminution of property value.

165. Greater Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Mass. Dept. of Telecomms. and Energy, 24
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 462 (2001) (holding that a state regulation imposing a
nondiscriminatory access requirement on MTEs was a physical rather than a regulatory
occupation. The regulation, therefore, constituted a taking under Loretto analysis.).
166. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (creating the following test: owner’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations, the nature of the government action, and the degree of
diminution in property value).
167. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 105.
168. Id. at 124.
169. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
170. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 126 (quoting Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)).
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Finally, the diminution of value in MTEs resulting from CLEC access
171
would be minimal at best. In Penn Central, the Court noted that besides
the continuing ability of the Appellants to use the station for its historical
purposes they also had been compensated for the loss of their airspace by
172
transferable building rights. This principle of average reciprocity may
exist in the case of CLEC access to MTEs. The short-term losses to MTE
owners may be offset by the increased attractiveness of their property to
potential high-tech renters due to more choice and/or capacity.
However, the extraction doctrine may support finding a taking within
the regulatory takings framework. Dolan held that “the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought
173
has little or no relationship to the property.” Thus, the Court held that if a
nexus existed between the building permit and the city’s purpose the action
174
would be constitutional. In Dolan, the Court found such a nexus.
However, Dolan added to Nollan’s reasonable nexus test a “rough
175
proportionality” test. The sacrifice required of the property owner must
176
be reasonable given the government’s purpose. In Dolan, city officials
could have requested that the owner build a drainage system for the
proposed parking lot, rather than asking for the property without showing
177
why a public drainage system was preferable to a private one.
Furthermore, a showing that a bike path might reduce traffic does not prove
that the proposed expansion would be responsible for the increase in traffic
178
to such an extent as to warrant seizing her property.
Nollan and Dolan together are inapplicable to the proposed rule
because the rule compels MTE owners to provide the equivalent of an
easement or greenway to CLECs without compensation. In Dolan, the
179
Petitioner could build if she gave the city a greenway; in Nollan, the
180
Appellant could build if he granted a public easement. Here, MTE
owners may open access to ILEC services if they also allow CLECs access.
The questions are whether a “reasonable nexus” and a “rough
proportionality” exist between the access and the rule. It seems likely that
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 393.
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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the rule would meet the nexus test. The rule’s purpose is to increase
competition among LECs and it provides them the means with which to
compete. The question of rough proportionality is more difficult. If the
regulation actually will increase competition, then the minor imposition
seems reasonable. However, if the access makes competition more likely or
just feasible, the uncertainty of the result makes it less reasonable to impose
on property rights. Furthermore, although commercial MTE owners are
essential to the LEC market, are they so important as to warrant being
singled out to bear the cost of this public benefit alone? Is this reasonable?
The proposed FCC rule does not create a strong enough fact pattern to
justify extending the Nollan and Dolan doctrines to situations where the
potential plaintiffs have not sought a benefit from the government and the
government has not granted such a benefit conditioned upon access to a
181
portion of the plaintiff’s property.

C. Alternatively, Whether the FCC May Prevent Multiple Tenant
Environment Owners from Adhering to Discriminatory Policies
Toward Local Exchange Carriers Indirectly Through Regulations
Preventing Local Exchange Carriers from Contracting with
Landlords Unwilling to Act in Accordance with the Pro-competition
Spirit of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The alternative rule proposed by the FCC is an indirect regulation that
would promote MTE owner compliance indirectly by barring LECs from
engaging in business transactions with owners who chose not to allow
182
CLECs nondiscriminatory access to their buildings. Here, there is clearly
no physical, or per se, taking. Furthermore, because in most cases the MTE
owner is not the subject of the regulation, the case is inapplicable to
183
traditional regulatory takings cases. It is the LECs who are being
regulated, not the MTE owners, except where the MTE owner is the service
provider. Moreover, the FCC has found that the LECs will not suffer a
184
taking under this rule because their property would not be occupied.
185
Nonetheless, the court could choose to find a derivative taking.
Derivative takings are based on the premise that a direct taking from a third
party also indirectly diminishes the property of another. Here, the unofficial
181. Id.; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
182. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 64.
183. See generally Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
184. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 144.
185. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90 (arguing that derivative taking must
follow either a physical or regulatory taking, but given the telecommunications fact pattern,
the situation seems highly analogous).
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taking from the ILECs also takes value from the MTE owner: the right to
exclude, temporary decreases in value during the wiring process due to the
construction, the loss of space, and so on. Although the ILEC regulation
does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking, according to the
FCC it does take away certain rights from these companies, such as
contract rights and valuable rights of access to property. As a result of this
sub-constitutional “taking,” a derivative taking forces the MTE owners to
accept physical occupation—the very thing that likely would be
unconstitutional if pursued directly.
Remember, however, in Yee the Court allowed a requirement to stand
that forced mobile home park owners to accept undesired tenants who had
186
purchased mobile homes from previously accepted tenants. The Court
noted that no one compelled the petitioners to rent their property to mobile
home tenants. The landlord could, after all, change the use of their land
187
upon proper notice.
Yet, the Yee scenario is more closely analogous to situations already
dealt with by the FCC, such as when CLECs install new equipment in a
tenant’s apartment. As long as the FCC has statutory authority and the
physical occupation is not a new occupation, the Commission can order
property owners to allow the installation of telecommunications
188
equipment. Thus, if the CLEC is installing new equipment within
apartments already under tenants’ control and is either sending signals via
wireless devices or via ILECs’ lines, no taking has occurred.
Furthermore, the worrisome aspects of takings in general also exist in
this context: The right to exclude is infringed upon and value is potentially
189
lost. Additionally, in a traditionally uncompensated derivative taking, the
government is not forced to internalize the negative externalities of its
190
actions—it is likely to take property even when the taking is inefficient.
Bell and Parchomovsky were able to demonstrate this in their recent article
191
through an analysis of the Lucas case. The government was willing to let
186. See generally Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
187. Id. at 528.
188. Implementation of Section 207 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report and
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 23874, paras. 12-15, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 192 (1998) [hereinafter
Implementation of Section 207 Report and Order] (stating that Section 207 of the 1996 Act
grants the Commission the authority to force landlords to allow tenants to install over-theair signal reception devices on property already occupied by the tenant).
189. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 288. According to the authors, Michelman
“insisted that, at the very least, one of the costs to be taken into account is the
demoralization that may result from the feeling of having been victimized by a government
taking.” Id.
190. See generally POSNER, supra note 94.
191. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 292.
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a private citizen bear the costs associated with preserving beachfront at a
cost of $425,000 per lot, but was unwilling to bear the cost of preservation
192
itself at the lesser fee of $77,500. Efficient allocation of the property
cannot be ensured because, without a formal determination of gains and
losses, it cannot be determined whether the winners’ gains outweigh the
193
losers’ losses. Nor can it be determined whether the gains are worth
paying for or if, at the very least, something like average
194
reciprocity exists.
There is case law to support the idea that this type of indirect
195
regulatory approach would constitute a taking. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in dicta that a regulation that indirectly forces a
196
Loretto-style per se taking likely would be unconstitutional. The case
involved a district court’s interpretation of a statute to allow cable
companies to “piggyback” on existing lines because the property owner
197
had already allowed other “compatible” occupations of his property. The
court based its concern on the fact that the MTE owners would be forced to
submit to a Loretto taking or lose the services of the other utilities/service
198
providers already serving tenants in the building.
This scenario relates to the extraction doctrine of both Nollan and
Dolan in that the regulation allows the government to seize private property
for a public use by manipulating the choices of private property owners
rather than by awarding appropriate compensation to the owners for their
199
loss. In effect, MTE owners are compelled to bear alone the cost of
nascent LEC competition rather than spreading the burden of this public
200
benefit among the general population. It may be that the imposition and
resultant loss in property value are too small to create a taking through such
an attenuated argument—simple loss of economic rent is not a cost. But is
it sound policy to manipulate the law to achieve what would otherwise be
an unconstitutional outcome? This road will lead to the same problems that
192. Id.
193. Id. at 291.
194. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
195. Cable Holdings of Ga. Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 60405 (11th Cir. 1992).
196. Id. at 605.
197. Id. at 601-02.
198. Id. at 605.
199. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).
200. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that “[t]he Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole”).
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the compensation clause attempts to address, such as infringement on
property and demoralization of persons subject to the effects of this
approach. Furthermore, will allowing the government and CLECs to avoid
paying for the access they desire actually spur competition, or will it create
an artificial market in which noncompetitive services are propped up via
regulation? If a CLEC’s service is competitive and beneficial to consumers,
it should be able to access the market without the government mandating
use of its services. Finally, practical considerations may make the
constitutionality of the alternative rule unimportant: Can the FCC really
enforce a rule that would cut off the phone service of thousands of
businesses to force a few MTE owners into compliance?

IV. WHETHER EITHER OF THE PROPOSED RULES FURTHER
THE UNDERLYING GOALS OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT OF 1996 IN A MANNER PROVIDING JUSTIFICATION
FOR GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED INTRUSIONS
INTO PRIVATE PROPERTY
A goal of the 1996 Act and the proposed FCC rule is to enhance
201
competition in telecommunications. Congress intended that the Act be
202
“pro-competitive and deregulatory.” It is therefore puzzling that the
means of achieving this goal is more regulation. It is true that established
monopolies started out with an advantage, but this advantage is now
lessened by the availability of unbundled services for resale, cable
203
telecommunications services, and wireless services. Forcing property
owners to allow access to CLECs may amount to “well-placed regulatory
dynamite [that] can certainly accelerate the [deregulatory] process” but
may also amount to a new regulatory system standing between LECs and
204
real competition. Bypassing the need to compensate property owners for
the loss of even small amounts of property enables the government and
CLECs to ignore externalities and to act in ways that may be
counterproductive to fully functional competition and future resource use.
The FCC spent years fostering the old integrated phone system only to be
201. HUBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
202. Randolph J. May, A Revolution that has yet to Occur: Why Deregulation Is The
Only Solution for A Telecom Industry in Crisis, FindLaw’s Legal Commentary, at
http://writ. news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021003_may.html (Oct. 3, 2002).
203. Promotion of Competitive Networks Report and Order, supra note 7, para. 11. But
see T. Randolph Beard et. al., Why ADCo? Why Now?: An Economic Exploration into the
Future of Industry Structure for the “Last Mile” in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54
FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002) (noting that because ILEC incentives have not been altered by
the 1996 Act, the resale of unbundled services environment remains unsupportive of the
effective CLEC competition).
204. HUBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 8-9.
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forced to dismantle it in the name of competition. This new plan may be
205
leading the FCC to a similar outcome.
Given stated goals, the optimal approach is one that will encourage
minimal regulation even during this transitional period while discouraging
CLEC reliance on governmental policies for achieving a competitive
market position. Finally, this approach avoids unnecessarily distressing
property owners. These interests appear disparate. However, although
complete satisfaction of all parties is unlikely, it should be possible to
reasonably accommodate all three goals.
Market pressures in real estate will force owners eventually to allow
CLECs access due to tenant demands—for example, not renewing leases or
threatening to move. If tenants fail to request these services and to exert
pressure on landlords, it may be that CLEC services are unattractive or
neutral and that the construction required for laying new lines is more
inconvenient than the CLECs are valuable. Promoting competition without
regard for the actual relative values of the services offered is likely to result
in an inefficient use of resources. It also is unlikely to spur research and
development to create a superior telecommunications system that Congress
envisioned when it called for deregulation. It is well accepted that
businesses only internalize costs that translate into dollars. If access to a
building is achievable at just the cost of actual wiring, and the CLECs are
protected through regulation from any barriers that building owners or
tenants might raise, CLECs are likely to wire buildings that result in a net
206
loss for all involved.
For example, if a building has 100 tenants, only twenty-five of whom
desire a different LEC service, the MTE owner is likely to charge the
CLEC an amount that will compensate the owner and the seventy-five
tenants who would prefer no building construction and its resultant
disruption to business. The CLEC then must set a price for services that
will cover the higher access costs and the twenty-five potential customers
must determine if the service is worthwhile at that price. The CLEC will
only go forward if the value to the customers is equal to or greater than the
loss suffered by the non-customer portion of the building. If, on the other
hand, CLECs are given access without compensation or negotiation, they
will go ahead and wire the building as long as the return from twenty-five
customers outweighs the baseline nondiscriminatory access fee and the cost
of wiring. They will not be forced to consider the additional cost to the
remaining residents and to the owner of the building, and inefficient results
are likely to occur.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Levinson, supra note 99, at 354.
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One could respond that a forced adherence to the Loretto rule is
inefficient and that bypassing it by constructing rules to regulate indirectly,
such as the alternative FCC rule, is the most effective way in which to
proceed. Otherwise, a policy of forcing companies into negotiations with
MTE owners and into hearings over the miniscule spaces that telephone
companies require to wire buildings would become an overwhelmingly
inhibitive barrier to CLECs. Case-by-case approaches may be acceptable
on a small scale but as more and more businesses require access to
advanced technology and more companies enter into competition, the
transaction costs of resolving individually each small takings/access issue
may far outweigh the end value transfer. However, this argument presumes
that MTE owners will never voluntarily request that a CLEC rewire a
building due to the desirability of the service being offered. If the CLECs
produce a valuable product, negotiating access will not remain fraught with
contention and costs.
It may appear that no regulation at all would be the best alternative.
However, it is clear that the long monopoly status of ILECs and their
current near-monopoly on facilities-based services in MTEs does give them
an advantage, especially when combined with MTE owner resistance to
CLECs. The proposed rule requiring nondiscriminatory access is likely to
help CLECs overcome MTE owners’ self-interest, if they operate their own
system, or merely inertia. It is the attempt to avoid a compensation
requirement that is problematic. Without compensation, MTE owners are
likely to feel resentment—which could translate into political pressure that
could endanger the program altogether. CLECs are likely to wire buildings
at an inefficient level, and are less likely to develop truly competitive
services, and the government, which unlike businesses, is able to
internalize purely social externalities, is likely either to ditch the effort or to
208
promulgate new rules to address the problems created by the old.
However, although compensation usually is beneficial whenever rights are
taken from property owners, asking the government to pay would not
achieve the desired results. The government’s behavior is not likely to be
209
influenced, at least in any predictable way, from being required to pay.
Furthermore, because government is already responsive to political
pressures, other methods of deterring or encouraging different levels of
regulation are available besides a costly individualized approach to the
development of CLEC facility-based services in MTEs.
207. The Loretto rule states that a physical occupation, no matter how small, is held to be
a taking. See infra Part III.B.
208. Levinson, supra note 99, at 357.
209. Id.
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Compensation will further regulatory goals if CLECs are required to
provide it to MTE owners. This allows CLECs to overcome unreasonable
barriers created by MTE owners through the nondiscriminatory access
requirement in a way that will help them move into a market dominated by
powerful, erstwhile monopolies. However, the extra compensation
requirement will force them to internalize the fact that their services are not
always desired. The actual payment may be minimal, but the process itself
will force CLECs to at least acknowledge the MTE owners’ position, and
thus will encourage them to develop competitive strategies in an effort to
cause MTE owners to waive the compensation. Rather than becoming
reliant on regulatory access, a compensation requirement borne by CLECs
will facilitate movement toward a truly negotiation-based and
competitive system.
The alternative proposed rule may avoid the compensation
requirement of a Loretto-style taking, but it is not the better choice; given
the goals driving this rulemaking process and more practical
considerations. The emphasis set on physical space as opposed to actual
value has played a role in the inequitable results of regulatory takings in
which up to 99% of a property’s value can be decimated, but, because it is
still 100% physically owned, no taking is found. At least in the area of
advanced technologies, including telecommunications, this framework for
takings is archaic and leads to irrational and arbitrary results—such as
recovery of one dollar in Loretto but no recovery in Penn Central, despite a
210
multimillion-dollar loss. In the long run, this artificial absence of real
valuation and supply-and-demand economics is unlikely to lead to a valid
system of competition.
Furthermore, this approach is out of step with modern views on
property. It is no longer viewed as a physicality but rather a more malleable
211
legal construct, an “almost infinitely divisible [bundle of] rights.” The
212
old emphasis on physical space has led to odd results. For example, in
Causby, property owners directly under a flight path were compensated
213
whereas those who owned adjacent property were not: “[E]ntrance into
protected airspace, not the disturbance it generated, forms the gist of the
214
government wrong.” But, the disturbance, not the use of airspace, was the
problem and the decision created a situation where a group of homeowners
210. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
211. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 286.
212. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
213. Id.
214. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 50 (1985) (commenting on the Causby Court’s reasoning).
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who had all suffered the same loss was divided into those who would
215
receive compensation and those who would receive nothing. Not only is
this unfair and likely to demoralize the population directly involved, but it
216
is inefficient. In ignoring real losses, the government fails to account for
an important variable before determining whether the taking is efficient—
”a taking is justified only if the net gains to the winners outweigh the net
217
costs to the losers.” If the people suffering less tangible or more minimal
invasions form a large enough group, a taking that looked efficient under
current doctrine may really amount to a societal net loss.
Finally, the FCC is unlikely to adopt the alternative rule for more
political reasons; even if it does choose to adopt that rule, the Commission
is unlikely to engage in vigorous enforcement. The government may act
unpredictably when monetary factors alone are at issue, but it reacts more
predictably when the pressure is political and judicial. Adopting the
alternative rule would create discontent in MTE owners and other real
estate entities, and would lead to more lobbying of the FCC and Congress.
More importantly, upon MTE resistance and attempted enforcement,
prohibiting any LEC from providing services would almost certainly lead
to legal action by businesses renting space in MTEs. It is highly unlikely
that any business would agree to shoulder the cost of opening up the market
for CLECs with revenue and goodwill losses caused by losing their phone
service altogether. Even short-term cuts in phone services are critical in
certain industries.
Forcing CLECs to enter into the market without any protection may
lead to a detrimental level of failures, but it is also more likely to spur real
innovation and development of technology. By promulgating the first
proposed rule, while requiring CLECs to bear the burden of compensating
MTE owners for the taking, the rule passes constitutional muster; prevents
unduly anticompetitive behavior by MTE owners without raising fairness
concerns; and forces CLECs to internalize the transaction costs of forced
access. Forcing this internalization will lead to high short-term transaction
costs but, over time, will prompt CLECs to improve their services through
technological innovation and marketing strategies, in order to reduce the
barrier created by the takings compensation process. The MTE owners
themselves will drop the barrier when the CLECs begin offering
competitive services that are more desirable to MTEs than either ILEC
services or their own private system. Some valuation must be allowed for if
215. Causby, 328 U.S. at 265.
216. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1215 (1967).
217. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 290.
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this intermediate regulatory system is to lead to free competition rather than
to another government-backed phone system.

V. CONCLUSION
This Note examined the application of takings law to the FCC’s
proposed MTE access rules. This Note first reviewed the 1996 Act and
identified how the proposed rules might encounter legal as well as political
opposition. The proposed rules potentially constitute takings and thus may
require compensation—keeping in mind that compensation is not
218
necessarily a bad thing. Second, this Note examined the proposed FCC
rules either requiring that MTEs allow nondiscriminatory access to their
buildings or, alternatively, preventing LECs from contracting with
landlords unwilling to “voluntarily” allow LECs nondiscriminatory access.
Through an analysis of both proposals it is clear that either rule is likely to
receive similar treatment in a court. Although the second proposed rule is
facially within the scope of FCC authority and avoids direct regulation of
MTEs, it effectively leverages the FCC’s unquestioned authority over
LECs into an unregulated area. This expansion of the FCC’s authority may
not be legitimate, at least without some sort of essential facility analysis of
MTEs that provides proof that MTEs are essential both to the CLECs’
ability to enter the market and to maintaining a competitive market overall.
If it is a legitimate exercise of authority, however, it is effectually a taking
and should be analyzed as such by the court. Therefore, either both
proposed rules constitute takings or both do not. The question is whether a
physical, regulatory or derivative takings analysis is applicable.
This Note concludes that it is unlikely a court will find that either rule
authorizes actions classified as takings. The first proposal, which requires
nondiscriminatory access, although potentially subject to a physical takings
analysis similar to Loretto, seems more amenable to a regulatory analysis
under Nollan and Dolan. Under this approach, unless it can be
demonstrated that access requirements will not increase competition, the
rule should pass the “reasonable nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests
219
and be held constitutional.
The alternative proposal, to achieve nondiscriminatory access by
prohibiting LECs from contracting with discriminatory MTEs, poses a

218. Compensation requirements prevent the government from overusing its Fifth
Amendment power to take property and, if placed on CLECs, a compensation obligation
will spread service development costs among those consumers who desire the new service
rather than placing the burden on one small group—MTEs.
219. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).

GORDON MAC15.DOC

130

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

12/02/02 5:18 PM

[Vol. 55

muddier question. It is not a traditional regulatory takings issue because the
MTE owner is not subject to the pertinent regulation. As noted above,
however, in effect the results of the alternative proposal are identical to
those of the first proposed rule. Therefore, a court could approach the rule
through a derivative takings analysis. However, the court is likely to find
that the rule is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose and that the costs,
if any, are proportional to the benefits. Consequently, either proposal is
likely to withstand a constitutional challenge.
The proposals, however, remain fundamentally flawed in two
respects. First, if successful, this rule will allow CLECs, contrary to public
policy, to rely on regulation and government backing rather than becoming
consumer driven and innovative, thus frustrating the purpose behind the
rule. If the goal is competition, the regulations already in place require only
minimal modification to provide CLECs with adequate entry points into the
market. Commercial tenants are not without resources and are capable of
exerting pressure on MTE owners if a desired service is valuable to them.
CLECs should be capable of developing marketable services, and if they
are not, artificially propping up the CLEC will only overburden the market
with a glut of unnecessary services and lower profitability in the industry.
This will prolong the CLEC’s inevitable demise while further entrenching
the government in the regulation business.
Second, the rules are not practicably enforceable. To compel
compliance, the FCC would be forced to block all phone service to
noncompliant MTEs, an action certain to inspire massive objections in the
form of lobbying and lawsuits by commercial tenants, many of whom are
powerful in their own right. It is therefore questionable whether the rules, if
passed, will be of any real consequence regarding LEC competition. The
rules will, however, be of more general consequence due to the fact that
either rule increases regulation of the industry contrary to the 1996 Act’s
mandate. In addition, the alternative proposal actually extends FCC
regulatory power beyond the telecommunications industry. Therefore, if
implemented, neither rule will produce the desired outcome, nor will either
rule further our current public policy goals under the 1996 Act.

